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ABSTRACT
Macroeconomic calibrations imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric studies.
One prominent explanation for this divergence is that indivisible labor generates extensive margin
responses that are not captured in micro studies of hours choices. We evaluate whether existing calibrations
of macro models are consistent with micro evidence on extensive margin responses using two approaches.
First, we use a standard calibrated macro model to simulate the impacts of tax policy changes on labor
supply. Second, we present a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin elasticities.
We find that micro estimates are consistent with macro evidence on the steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities
relevant for cross-country comparisons. However, micro estimates of extensive-margin elasticities
are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in
aggregate hours. Hence, indivisible labor supply does not explain the large gap between micro and
macro estimates of intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities. Our synthesis of the micro evidence
points to Hicksian elasticities of 0.3 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin and Frisch elasticities
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Macroeconomic models of ￿ uctuations in hours of work over the business cycle or across coun-
tries imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric estimates of hours
elasticities. Understanding this divergence is critical for questions ranging from the sources
of business cycles to the impacts of tax policy on growth and inequality. Starting with the
seminal work of Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), one leading explanation of the divergence
is the extensive margin response created by indivisible labor supply. If labor supply is indivis-
ible, changes in tax or wage rates can generate large changes in aggregate hours by inducing
extensive margin (participation) responses even if they have little e⁄ect on hours conditional
on employment. In view of this argument, modern macro models are calibrated to match
low micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities. However, the extensive margin elasticity
is usually treated as a free parameter that can be calibrated purely to match macroeconomic
moments.
We argue that the extensive margin elasticity should not be treated as a free parameter.
Macro models should be calibrated to match micro estimates of extensive margin elasticities
in the same way that they are calibrated to match micro estimates of intensive margin elastic-
ities. The size of the extensive margin responses depends on the density of the distribution
of reservation wages around the economy￿ s equilibrium. The same marginal density that de-
termines the impacts of macroeconomic variation on aggregate employment also determines
the impacts of quasi-experiments such as tax policy changes on employment rates. Micro
estimates of extensive margin elasticities can therefore be used to calibrate macro models.1
In this paper, we assess whether existing calibrations of macro models are consistent with
micro evidence on extensive margin responses. In doing so, we ￿nd that it is crucial to dis-
tinguish between two types of elasticities: Hicksian and Frisch. The Frisch (marginal utility
constant) elasticity controls intertemporal substitution responses to temporary wage ￿ uctua-
tions and is therefore the relevant parameter for understanding labor supply ￿ uctuations over
the business cycle.2 The Hicksian (wealth constant) elasticity controls steady-state responses
1The distribution of reservation wages at the margin could vary across subgroups, potentially generating
di⁄erences between micro and macro estimates of extensive-margin responses. As we explain below, observable
heterogeneity in elasticities across subgroups reinforces our conclusions.
2The extensive margin Frisch elasticity is technically ill-de￿ned because each agent is not at an interior
optimum. We therefore de￿ne the Frisch extensive elasticity empirically as the impact of an in￿nitismal, tem-to permanent wage changes and is therefore the relevant parameter for understanding di⁄er-
ences in labor supply across countries with di⁄erent tax systems. We use two approaches
to comparing macro calibrations with micro evidence: simulations of quasi-experiments and a
meta-analysis of micro elasticity estimates. Both approaches show that micro and macro evi-
dence agree about Hicksian (steady state) elasticities but disagree about Frisch (intertemporal
substitution) elasticities.
We begin by simulating the impacts of policy changes that generate exogenous changes in
incentives to work in a standard macro model and comparing the predicted responses with the
￿ndings of microeconometric studies. We use Rogerson and Wallenius￿(2009) [RW] calibrated
model of life cycle labor supply as a benchmark model for this exercise. The RW model
matches macro evidence by generating an intertemporal substitution elasticity of aggregate
hours above 2 even when calibrated to generate a Frisch intensive-margin elasticity below 0.5.
We simulate labor supply responses to three policies using this model: (1) a tax-free year
in Iceland in 1987 studied by Bianchi et al. (2001), (2) a randomized experiment providing
temporary subsidies for work to welfare recipients in Canada (Card and Hyslop 2005), and
(3) the 1994 expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income individuals
in the United States (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). The ￿rst two examples are ideal for
identifying Frisch elasticities because they induce temporary variation in wage rates. Bianchi
et al. (2001) ￿nd that employment rates in Iceland do indeed rise in 1987, but the increase
is only one ￿fth as large as that predicted by the RW model. Similarly, the calibrated RW
model predicts intertemporal substitution responses to the work subsidies in Canada that are
nearly four times larger than what Card and Hyslop observe in their data. The third example
￿the EITC expansion ￿generates permanent variation in tax rates and thus is well-suited for
identifying steady-state elasticities. The RW model performs better in matching the impacts
of the EITC expansion on employment rates because it generates a Hicksian aggregate hours
elasticity of approximately 0.7, resulting in steady-state impacts of taxes on labor supply that
are closer to micro estimates.
While our quantitative results rest on the particular assumptions of the RW model, our
qualitative conclusions apply more generally. Any macro model that relies primarily on changes
porary wage change on employment rates. This is the relevant elasticity for evaluating employment responses
to business cycle ￿ uctuations.
2in labor supply to generate business cycle ￿ uctuations must feature a large extensive margin
Frisch elasticity. As a result, any such model will over-predict the response to temporary wage
changes such as the tax holiday in Iceland and work subsidies in Canada. Intuitively, ￿ uctua-
tions in employment over the business cycle and the employment e⁄ects of quasi-experimental
wage changes are both fundamentally determined by the same density of the reservation wage
distribution at the margin irrespective of model speci￿cation. Thus, any labor supply model
that ￿ts the quasi-experimental evidence cannot generate large ￿ uctuations in employment
over the business cycle.
To explore whether the results of the three studies we consider in the simulations are repre-
sentative of the broader empirical literature, we conduct a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental
estimates of extensive margin elasticities. We summarize results from ￿fteen studies that span
a broad range of countries, demographic groups, time periods, and sources of variation. These
studies generally analyze changes in incentives for small subgroups of the population, permit-
ting identi￿cation of labor supply elasticities that are not confounded by changes in equilibrium
wage rates. Despite the great variation in methodologies, there is consensus about extensive
margin elasticities. The mean extensive margin elasticity among the studies we consider is
0.28 and every estimate is below 0.43. The intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticity es-
timates for temporary policy changes turn out be quite similar to the steady-state elasticity
estimates obtained from permanent policy changes. The small elasticities imply that most
individuals are at a corner in their employment choices; that is, the density of individuals at
the margin of employment is thin in practice.
We conclude our analysis by evaluating whether extensive margin elasticities of around 0.25
as suggested by micro evidence are adequate to reconcile the gap between micro and macro
estimates of aggregate hours elasticities. To do so, we summarize micro and macro estimates
of Hicksian and Frisch elasticities on both the extensive and intensive margins. We ￿nd that
micro and macro studies agree about the steady-state impacts of taxes on labor supply. Both
micro and macro studies imply Hicksian extensive margin elasticities around 0.2. And both
micro and macro evidence are consistent with intensive margin elasticities around 0.3 once
one accounts for frictions that may attenuate observed micro estimates (Chetty et al. 2011a,
Chetty 2012). Prescott￿ s (2004) widely-cited cross-country dataset implies an aggregate hours
3(extensive plus intensive) Hicksian elasticity of 0.7, only slightly larger than micro estimates.3
These ￿ndings indicate that labor supply responses to taxation could indeed explain much of
the variation in hours of work across countries with di⁄erent tax systems.4
On the intertemporal substitution margin, the limited existing evidence on intensive mar-
gin elasticities suggests that values around 0.5 are consistent with both micro and macro
data. However, micro and macro estimates of extensive margin intertemporal substitution
elasticities di⁄er by an order of magnitude. Quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin
intertemporal substitution elasticities are around 0.25. In contrast, pure equilibrium macro
models, in which employment ￿ uctuations are driven purely by preferences, imply intertempo-
ral substitution extensive margin elasticities in excess of 2. Hence, the puzzle to be resolved
is why employment rates ￿ uctuate so much over the business cycle relative to what one would
predict based on the impacts of tax changes on employment rates ￿that is, why micro and
macro estimates of the Frisch extensive margin elasticity are so di⁄erent.5 Even accounting
for indivisible labor, micro studies do not support representative-agent macro models that
generate Frisch elasticities above 1.
There are two potential concerns that one may have with using microeconomic estimates to
calibrate macroeconomic models. The ￿rst is that heterogeneity in extensive margin responses
complicates the mapping from micro estimates to macro elasticities that re￿ ect economy-wide
behavior.6 This problem is compounded by the concern that micro studies sometimes exclude
important subgroups that could matter for economy-wide extensive margin responses (Dyrda
et al. 2012). In practice, however, heterogeneity across subgroups appears to strengthens our
main conclusion about agreement on the Hicksian elasticity but disagreement on the Frisch
3Prescott reports an elasticity of approximately 3 in his paper. Importantly, this is a Frisch rather than
Hicksian elasticity. Prescott implicitly maps the Hicksian elasticity of 0.7 implied by the data to a Frisch
elasticity of 3 based on speci￿c parametric assumptions. See Section 2 below for further details.
4Other factors, such as institutions or regulations, could also play a signi￿cant role in explaining cross-country
hours di⁄erences (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005). Our analysis does not rule out the importance of
such factors. We simply show that micro estimates of labor supply elasticities are consistent with observed
di⁄erences in aggregate hours across countries with di⁄erent tax systems.
5Some progress has been made in recent years on this front: for instance, search and matching models with
rigid wages (e.g. Hall 2009) can potentially match business cycle ￿ uctuations with smaller extensive margin
labor supply elasticities.
6Note that the same problem could in principle arise with intensive margin elasticities as well. Although
macro models are often parametrized so that the intensive margin elasticity is constant by assumption, there is
no economic reason for intensive margin elasticities to remain constant as wage rates change. Hence, if one is
willing to use micro estimates to calibrate intensive margin elasticities, one should be equally willing to do so
on the extensive margin as well.
4elasticity. The heterogeneity in micro estimates of extensive-margin Hicksian elasticities mir-
rors the heterogeneity observed in macro studies of steady-state responses. For instance, both
micro and macro studies indicate that extensive-margin elasticities are higher for subgroups
that are less attached to the labor force, such as single mothers and individuals near retire-
ment. However, heterogeneity magni￿es the discrepancy between micro and macro estimates
of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Most notably, employment rates ￿ uctuate substan-
tially over the business cycle even for prime-age males, which stands in sharp contrast with
the near-zero micro extensive margin Frisch elasticity estimates for this group.
A second potential concern in mapping micro estimates to macro labor supply elastici-
ties is that reduced-form micro studies may not directly identify the structural primitives of
the reservation wage distribution that control extensive margin labor supply choices. This
is particularly a concern if frictions prevent the labor market from clearing, as our analysis
suggests. In a model with frictions, reduced-form micro elasticity estimates represent a con-
volution of the density of the reservation wage distribution at the margin and other structural
parameters, such as the distribution of adjustment costs or search frictions or the degree of
liquidity constraints. Importantly, the same reduced-form elasticities would also determine
the impact of wage changes on labor supply over the business cycle in such an environment.
Hence, micro estimates should continue to provide useful targets for calibrating macro models
even though they do not identify the structure of preferences or other primitives necessary
for normative analysis.7 However, especially when reduced-form elasticities combine several
structural parameters, they may not be stable across settings. Because of this instability, one
should not seek to calibrate macro models to match any single estimate of a micro elasticity.
Nevertheless, one can gauge the range of plausible magnitudes by pooling evidence from many
di⁄erent studies and settings as we do here. The fact that every quasi-experimental study we
review ￿nds elasticities signi￿cantly less than 0.5 casts doubt upon macro models calibrated
with extensive margin elasticities above 1.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie￿ y reviews the existing litera-
ture on indivisible labor. In Section 3, we establish a terminology for the various elasticity
7Some micro studies attempt to strip out frictions by studying subgroups such as bike messengers or taxi
drivers who can choose their daily labor supply more freely. However, it is not clear that these pure labor
supply elasticity estimates are more relevant for macro calibrations. If the same frictions that constrain salaried
workers from responding to tax changes also contrain their responses to ￿ uctuations over the business cycle,
then it is the observed reduced-form elasticity for the average worker that matters.
5concepts, as these terms are often used in di⁄erent ways in the existing literature. Section 4 re-
ports simulations of the three quasi-experiments in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model.
Section 5 presents the meta-analysis of micro estimates. In Section 6, we compare micro and
macro evidence on the intensive and extensive margins. Section 7 concludes. Details of the
simulation methods and meta-analysis are given in the appendix.
2 Indivisible Labor: Background
Equilibrium macroeconomic models ￿ in which di⁄erences in hours of work are driven by
preferences ￿require large labor supply elasticities to explain the variation in hours of work
over the business cycle and across countries with di⁄erent tax regimes. In contrast, quasi-
experimental microeconometric studies of the impacts of tax reforms on hours of work and
earnings typically obtain elasticities close to zero for most groups except very high income
earners.8
A large literature has posited that the discrepancy between micro and macro elasticities can
be explained by indivisibilities in labor (e.g. Hansen 1985, Rogerson 1988, Cho and Rogerson
1988, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, Cho and Cooley 1994, King and Rebelo 1999, Chang
and Kim 2006, Ljungqvist and Sargent 2006, Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius 2009, Rogerson
and Wallenius 2009).9 If individuals cannot freely choose hours of work or face ￿xed costs
of entry, aggregate employment depends upon the distribution of reservation wages in the
economy. If this distribution has substantial density at the margin ￿i.e., many individuals are
indi⁄erent between working and not working at prevailing wage rates ￿then a small reduction
in wage rates could reduce aggregate hours of work signi￿cantly because many individuals will
stop working. Yet the same change in wage rates may not a⁄ect hours of work conditional
on employment very much, implying a small intensive margin labor supply elasticity. As a
result, a model with large extensive margin elasticities and small intensive margin elasticities
could match both the micro and macro evidence. Motivated by these results, modern macro
8Early estimates of intensive-margin elasticities include MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986), and Angrist (1991).
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) review this literature. Chetty (2009) and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2011)
summarize more recent quasi-experimental intensive margin elasticity estimates.
9The literature has taken two approaches to aggregation with indivisible labor supply: aggregation over
states via employment lotteries (e.g. Hansen 1985, Rogerson 1988) or aggregation over time periods in a
lifecycle model (e.g. Mulligan 2001, Ljungqvist and Sargent 2006, Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius 2009).
The micro evidence on extensive margin responses we review here is most easily interpreted through the modern
life cycle models.
6models are calibrated to match micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities but typically
calibrate the extensive margin elasticity purely to match macroeconomic moments (King and
Rebelo 1999, Rogerson and Wallenius 2009, Ljungqvist and Sargent 2011).
In parallel with the development of macro models of indivisible labor supply, a large micro-
econometric literature has recognized the importance of the extensive margin in the analysis
of labor supply. Ashenfelter (1984) and Heckman (1984) discuss the importance of exten-
sive margin labor supply choices in the analysis of aggregate ￿ uctuations. Heckman and
Killingsworth (1986) and Heckman (1993) review the literature on labor supply models that
explicitly model participation decisions. More recent research has estimated extensive margin
elasticities using quasi-experimental methods.
However, macro models have not been calibrated to match micro evidence on extensive
margin elasticities. One complication in performing such a calibration is that extensive mar-
gin elasticities vary with the wage rate unless the density of the reservation wage distribution
happens to be uniform. Hence, any micro estimate of an extensive margin elasticity is nec-
essarily local to the wage variation used for identi￿cation. However, this argument does not
justify treating the extensive margin elasticity as a free parameter for two reasons. First,
if the micro estimates are identi￿ed using variation similar to that used in macroeconomic
comparisons, one will obtain the appropriate local elasticity relevant for macro calibrations.
Second, the same problem arises when calibrating macro models with micro estimates of in-
tensive margin elasticities, insofar as elasticities will only be constant on the intensive margin
if utility happens to produce a constant-elasticity labor supply function. We revisit this issue
in Section 6 and show that, if anything, observable heterogeneity in elasticities reinforces the
conclusions drawn below.
3 Terminology
It is helpful to establish some conventions about terminology given the various elasticity con-
cepts discussed in this paper. We distinguish between elasticities based on the margin of
response (extensive vs. intensive) and the timing of response (intertemporal substitution vs.
steady state). There are four elasticities of interest: steady-state extensive, steady-state in-
tensive, intertemporal extensive, and intertemporal intensive. Each of these four elasticities
7can be estimated using both micro (quasi-experimental) and macroeconomic variation. We
use the terms ￿micro￿and ￿macro￿elasticities exclusively to refer to the source of variation
used to estimate the elasticity. The elasticity of aggregate hours ￿the relevant parameter for
calibrating a representative agent model ￿is the sum of the extensive and intensive margin
elasticities, weighted by hours of work if individuals have heterogeneous preferences (Blundell,
Bozio, and Laroque 2011).
The macro literature uses the term ￿macro elasticity￿to refer to the Frisch elasticity of
aggregate hours and ￿micro elasticity￿to refer to the intensive-margin elasticity of hours con-
ditional on employment (e.g. Prescott 2004, Rogerson and Wallenius 2009). We use di⁄erent
terminology here for two reasons. First, the intensive-margin is no more ￿micro￿than the ex-
tensive margin; both are determined by household-level choices and both have been estimated
using micro data. Second, and more importantly, the Frisch elasticity is critical for under-
standing business cycle ￿ uctuations in models where aggregate hours ￿ uctuations are purely
driven by labor supply, but it is not the relevant parameter for evaluating the steady-state im-
pacts of di⁄erences in taxes across countries. The Frisch (marginal utility constant) elasticity
controls intertemporal substitution responses to temporary wage ￿ uctuations, while the Hick-
sian (wealth constant) elasticity controls steady-state responses and the welfare consequences
of taxation (MaCurdy 1981, Auerbach 1985).10
The distinction between Hicksian and Frisch elasticities is quite important in practice.
Prescott (2004) reports that cross-country di⁄erences in aggregate hours imply an elasticity of
3 in a representative-agent model, whereas Davis and Henrekson (2005) estimate an elasticity
of 0.33 using similar data. The di⁄erence arises primarily because Prescott reports a Frisch
elasticity whereas Davis and Henrekson report a Hicksian elasticity. Regressing log hours
on log tax rates in Prescott￿ s data yields a Hicksian elasticity of 0.7, as shown in Figure 2a
below. Prescott maps this estimate of the Hicksian elasticity into a value for a Frisch elasticity
based on parametric assumptions about utility and the wealth-earnings ratio. When utility
is time-separable, the Frisch ("F) and Hicksian ("H) elasticities are related by the following
10The Hicksian elasticity determines the impact of taxes in steady-state if government revenues are returned
to the consumer as a lump sum, as commonly assumed in representative-agent macro models. If revenues are
not returned to consumers, tax changes have income e⁄ects and the Marshallian elasticity becomes the relevant
parameter.
8identity (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999, Browning 2005):






where ￿ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),
d[wl]
dA is the marginal propensity
to earn out of unearned income, and A
wl is the ratio of assets to earnings. The reason that
Prescott obtains a much larger value of "F than "H is that the parametric utility speci￿cation
he uses produces large values of A
wl and
d[wl]
dA . However, microeconometric evidence shows that
income e⁄ects on labor supply are much smaller than those produced by the Prescott utility
speci￿cation (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993, Imbens et al. 2001). Under a utility




elasticity is only slightly larger than the Hicksian elasticity because the di⁄erence between the
two elasticities is proportional to the income e⁄ect squared (
d[wl]
dA )2 (Chetty 2012, Table III).11
4 Simulations of Quasi-Experiments in the RW Model
We evaluate whether macro models with indivisible labor are consistent with micro evidence on
extensive margin responses by focusing on the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model. The RW
model is a leading example of recent models of indivisible labor that aggregate over individuals
by time-averaging over the life cycle, as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006). The model is well-
suited for our purposes because it features both an extensive and intensive margin of labor
supply. RW calibrate their model to show that small intensive-margin micro elasticities are
consistent with a large Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours. We adopt the parameters chosen by
RW and simulate the impacts of policy changes analyzed in three prominent microeconometric
studies.12
Setup. RW analyze an overlapping-generations model in which a unit mass of agents is
born at each instant and lives for one unit of time. An individual who supplies h(a) 2 [0;1]
hours at age a produces e(a) ￿ max
￿
h(a) ￿ ￿ h;0
￿
e¢ ciency units of labor, where e(a) =
11Subsequent studies calibrate models to match Prescott￿ s Frisch elasticity of 3, but choose a di⁄erent func-
tional form for utility and wealth-earnings ratios (e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig 2009). The conclusions drawn by
these studies ￿e.g. that reductions in tax rates would increase tax revenue ￿might di⁄er had they directly
matched the steady state elasticity of 0.7 implied by Prescott￿ s data.
12On the intertemporal substitution margin, we sought to maximize the model￿ s chance of ￿tting the data
by analyzing the two studies that obtain the largest intertemporal elasticity estimates among those considered
in our meta analysis (Table 1). On the steady-state response, we chose a representative study of a well-known






￿ is a tent-shaped life-cycle productivity pro￿le and ￿ h > 0. Complete asset










da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
0
e(a)max(h(a) ￿ ￿ h;0)da + T
where ￿ is the tax rate and T is a lump-sum tax rebate that balances the government￿ s
budget. The model can be solved analytically as described in RW and in the technical
appendix. Because wages are paid per e¢ ciency unit, individuals have low hourly wage rates
at the beginning and end of their lives and ￿nd it optimal not to work at those points. This
generates an extensive margin of participation over the life cycle. The convex disutility over
hours of work generates an intensive margin hours response to changes in wage rates as well.
RW normalize the price of output to 1 and assume a constant-returns-to-scale production
technology, so changes in tax rates have no impact on pre-tax wages and prices. Accordingly,
the quasi-experiments we simulate also hold pre-tax wages and prices constant, as the studies
on which they are based typically analyze the impacts of di⁄erential changes in incentives for
relatively small subgroups of the population.
RW calibrate the parameters ￿, e1, and ￿ h to match empirically observed values for the
fraction of life worked (f), the maximum hours worked per week over the life cycle (hmax), and
the wage rate at retirement relative to the maximum wage rate over the life cycle (wR=wmax).
Following RW, we set hmax = 45% (45 hours per week) and wR=wmax = 1=2. We set f
to match the aggregate employment rate in the period prior to each policy experiment we
consider. The parameter ￿ controls the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, as in standard life
cycle models (Card 1990). We set ￿ = 2 to obtain an intensive margin Frisch elasticity of
"INT = 1
￿ = 0:5, consistent with the microeconometric evidence summarized below; we show in
Appendix A that setting "INT = 0:25 yields similar results.13 For each of the three tax policy
changes simulated below, we choose the model￿ s remaining parameters f￿;e1;￿ hg to match the
moments fhmax;wR=wmax;fg under the tax system prior to the tax change.14 In all three
13RW show that the intertemporal elasticity of aggregate hours in their model is not sensitive to the intensive-
margin intertemporal elasticity. They therefore calibrate ￿, e1, and h to match the three moments conditional
on various values of ￿.
14In one of the simulations, the welfare demonstration in Canada, a small enough fraction of the population
is employed prior to the intervention that ￿tting wR=wmax = 1=2 would require negative productivity at certain
points in the life cycle. Consequently, for that simulation, we set e1 = 0, generating
wR
wmax = :615.
10cases, the calibrated model generates an intertemporal substitution elasticity for aggregate
hours above 2 despite having an intensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticity of only
0.5, consistent with RW￿ s main result.15 As in RW, we assume that each agent lives for 60
years (corresponding to average adult working lives) and simulate each quasi-experiment by
changing the tax rate for the number of periods in the model that correspond to the duration
of the tax policy change in the data.16
To simulate the impacts of unanticipated tax changes, we must specify how the lump sum
rebate T changes for each agent. To simplify aggregation, we assume that each generation
receives a lump-sum rebate equal to the taxes they pay at each instant in time.17 We ignore
heterogeneity in the tax system across individuals and set ￿ equal to the average tax rate for
the subgroup analyzed (which is relevant for extensive margin decisions).
Experiment 1: Tax Holiday in Iceland. In 1987, Iceland suspended its income tax for
one year as it transitioned from a system under which taxes were paid on the previous year￿ s
income to a system where taxes were paid on current earnings. In 1987, individuals paid tax
on income earned in 1986; in 1988, individuals were taxed on income earned in 1988, and thus
income in 1987 was untaxed. The average tax rate was 14.5% in 1986, 0 in 1987, and 8.0%
in 1988 (Bianchi et al. 2001). Although this tax change could also produce a change in labor
demand due to a general equilibrium impact on wage rates, the tax holiday had no impact on
labor supply for individuals with low initial tax rates (Bianchi et al. 2001, Figure 9). This
implies that the general equilibrium feedback on wage rates was negligible, so the aggregate
employment response can be interpreted as a labor supply elasticity.18 We simulate the tax
reform in Iceland in the RW model under the assumption that the tax system remains stable
prior to 1986 and after 1988. The reform was announced in late 1986, so we model the tax
change as an unanticipated change at the start of 1987. The average employment rate in the
15We calculate this and all other Frisch elasticities by simulating the impact of a small, temporary tax change
in the RW model. This direct calculation of the Frisch elasticity di⁄ers from the values reported by RW.
RW report aggregate hours Frisch elasticities for a stand-in household whose behavior matches the aggregate
steady-state properties of their economy. However, this stand-in household￿ s behavior does not necessarily
match the aggregate intertemporal substitution properties of the RW model.
16To characterize high frequency dynamics precisely, we simulate the model with at least 100 periods per year
in all cases; see the technical appendix for details.
17Tax policy changes a⁄ect each generation di⁄erently because they are at di⁄erent points in the lifecycle
when the change occurs.
18Stated di⁄erently, the di⁄erential response for workers who experienced larger changes in tax rates can be
interpreted as a pure labor supply elasticity that nets out changes in wage rates. Bianchi et al.￿ s analysis
reveals that this di⁄erential impact is similar to the aggregate impact we simulate here.
11three year period prior to the reform is f = 79:2%, which implies that individuals work for 47.5
years in the model. The single-year tax reduction thus comes close to the ideal experiment for
identifying a Frisch elasticity of reducing tax rates for an in￿nitesimal fraction of the working
life.
Figure 1a plots annual changes in employment rates (the employment rate in year t minus
the employment rate in year t ￿ 1) around the reform, demarcated by the vertical line. The
Icelandic administrative records analyzed by Bianchi et al. (blue squares) show a modest but
signi￿cant increase in employment rates in 1987 followed by a sharp dip in 1988, consistent
with intertemporal substitution. The impact predicted by the RW model (red circles) is an
order of magnitude larger than the observed impact. In the data, employment is 3 percentage
points higher in 1987 relative to 1988, but the RW model predicts that it would be 13.5
percentage points higher. The model generates a much larger spike in employment because
the fraction of cohorts that are close to being indi⁄erent between working and staying out of
the labor force is large. The temporary increase in the wage rates therefore induces a large
group of agents to work. Note that it is precisely this mechanism ￿having a large fraction
of individual near the margin ￿that allows the RW model to generate a large Frisch elasticity
for aggregate hours and thus explain ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours over the business cycle.
Experiment 2: SSP Welfare Demonstration in Canada. The Iceland analysis focuses on
employment changes in the aggregate economy, which are relevant for understanding business
cycle ￿ uctuations but may mask substantial heterogeneity across groups. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006), Rogerson and Wallenius (2007), and others emphasize that certain groups of
the population ￿such an individuals near retirement or those with low wage rates ￿are likely to
exhibit particularly large extensive margin responses and drive the change in aggregate hours.
To evaluate whether the model￿ s predictions are more accurate for these more elastic subgroups,
we consider a policy experiment targeted at welfare recipients who frequently transition in and
out of the labor force.
In the early 1990s, the Canadian government conducted the Self Su¢ ciency Project (SSP)
to test whether a temporary earnings subsidy could induce welfare recipients to start working.
The project was a randomized experiment involving over 5,000 single parents who had been
on welfare for at least one year. Half the individuals (the treatment group) were given a large
12subsidy if they worked more than 30 hours per week. The subsidy lasted for 36 months.19
Under the prevailing welfare system in Canada, welfare payments were reduced dollar-for-
dollar with earnings above a low baseline level. As a result, a single parent with one child
in the control group faced an e⁄ective average tax rate of 74.3% when moving from no work
to full-time work (see Appendix A). In contrast, an individual in the treatment group faced
an e⁄ective average tax rate of 16.7% for the same change. The employment rate during the
month the experiment began was f = 23:5%.
Card and Hyslop (2005) use survey data to calculate employment rates at a monthly
frequency for 53 months starting from the month of random assignment. Figure 1b plots
monthly employment rates after the experimental intervention began. The series in blue
squares shows the di⁄erence in employment rates for the treatment group relative to the control
group (Card and Hyslop, Figure 3a), with the model the SSP experiment as a tax reform that
lowers the tax rate from ￿ = 74:3% to ￿ = 16:7% for a three year period, after which the
tax rate reverts to ￿ = 74:3%. The pre-experiment employment rate of 23.5% is added
to the di⁄erence to facilitate interpretation of the scale. The data show that the subsidy
had a substantial impact: employment rates rise by approximately 14 percentage points in
the treatment group relative to the control group a year after the subsidy was introduced.
These employment gains fade away after the subsidy expires, consistent with intertemporal
substitution.
The series in red circles in Figure 1b shows the corresponding impacts predicted by the
RW model. Because the sample analyzed by Card and Hyslop consists primarily of younger
individuals (less than 2.5% of the sample is over age 50), we report simulated employment
rates for individuals in the ￿rst half of the life cycle (ages 16-46). The impacts predicted by
the calibrated model ￿an employment increase of 52.8 percentage points one year after the
subsidy is introduced ￿are again substantially larger than what is observed in the data. Hence,
even for subgroups that are closer to the margin of entering or exiting the labor force and are
therefore more elastic, the RW model signi￿cantly over-predicts extensive margin responses.
One may be concerned that liquidity constraints attenuate the degree of intertemporal
19Individuals were given up to one year to start working and the 36 month period began after they started
to work. This feature of the program generated an incentive to establish eligibility for the subsidy by working
within the ￿rst year, accentuating the intertemporal substitution incentive. We ignore this feature of the
program in our simulation by assuming that the subsidy starts immediately after random assignment. This
simpli￿cation biases the size of the employment increase predicted by our simulation downward.
13substitution in the low-income population treated by the SSP. The estimated elasticity there-
fore may not directly identify preference parameters in the RW model. However, as noted
above, the same liquidity constraints should also a⁄ect employment responses to business cycle
￿ uctuations in wage rates. Hence, the reduced-form response estimated by Card and Hyslop
is still informative about the magnitude of labor supply ￿ uctuations over the cycle for this
subgroup.
Experiment 3: Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. The last policy change we consider
￿the expansion of the EITC in 1994 analyzed by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000, 2001) and
Meyer (2010) ￿is a permanent tax change whose impact is determined by the Hicksian rather
than the Frisch elasticity.20 The EITC expansion lowered average tax rates (including implicit
taxes generated by the phase-out of transfers) from 50.8% in 1992 to 43.6% in 1996 for single
mothers (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, Table 2).21 Roughly half of the expansion occurred in
1994. For simplicity, we model the tax change under the assumption that the change occurs
immediately at the start of 1994, ignoring the phase-in of the reform. We also assume as
above that the tax system remains stable prior to 1994. The average employment rate for the
single mothers is f = 79:1% in the three years preceding the reform.
Figure 1c shows the employment rates of single mothers around the 1994 reform using data
from Meyer (2010, Figure 2). The series in blue circles shows employment rates for single
mothers with 1 or 2 children, adjusted for time trends and changes in observables as in Meyer
(2010) (see Appendix A for details). The labor force participation rate of single mothers rose
from 79.6% in 1993 to 85.8% in 1997 after the EITC expansion was fully phased in. The
RW model predicts a 6.0 percentage point increase in employment rates on impact and an
additional 0.3 percentage point rise over the subsequent 5 years. The impact predicted by
the model is thus very similar to the observed impact.
The RW model performs much better in predicting the impacts of the EITC expansion
than the preceding experiments because it predicts much smaller steady-state responses than
intertemporal substitution responses. Intuitively, a permanent change generates a much
20If the tax change is not rebated to the consumer as a lump sum, its impact depends on the uncompensated
(Marshallian) elasticity rather than the Hicksian elasticity. In practice, microeconometric estimates of income
e⁄ects are quite small (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote 2001), suggesting
that the impact of the EITC change is well approximated by the Hicksian elasticity.
21The changes in average tax rates in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) take into account conurrent changes in
bene￿ts from welfare and Medicaid. See Appendix A for details.
14lower elasticity because all generations increase their labor supply at the point in their life
cycle when they are most productive, smoothing the aggregate response across time. With a
temporary change, every generation has an incentive to work when net-of-tax wage rates are
high, resulting in a large Frisch elasticity.22 In the RW model, a large mass of cohorts is at the
margin with respect to a temporary tax change or wage ￿ uctuation because individuals do not
have strong preferences over when they work during their lives. However, in any given period,
a much smaller fraction of individuals within each cohort are at the margin with respect to a
permanent change in incentives.
Together, the simulations highlight two results that we develop further below. First, the
extensive margin elasticities required to explain the sharp ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours over
the business cycle are far larger than micro estimates. Second, micro and macro evidence are
in much closer alignment about the steady-state impacts of taxes on labor supply.
Although the quantitative results of our simulations depend to some extent upon the
parametric choices made by RW, we expect these lessons to apply more broadly. Generating a
large macro Frisch elasticity by having a large fraction of individuals who are nearly indi⁄erent
between working and not working is precisely what delivers predictions about how temporary
tax changes a⁄ect employment rates that contradict the data. A macro model calibrated
to match micro estimates of extensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticities would no
longer generate large Frisch elasticities for aggregate hours.
5 Meta-Analysis
In this section, we evaluate whether the three quasi-experiments considered above are repre-
sentative of the broader literature by conducting a meta-analysis of extensive margin elasticity
estimates. Although several papers have reviewed intensive margin elasticities (e.g. Pen-
cavel 1986, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999, Chetty 2012), we are not aware of a meta-analysis of
quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin elasticities.
We focus on reduced-form studies that use changes in tax policies or long-term wage trends
for identi￿cation rather than structural studies that exploit variation in wage rates at the in-
22Although the SSP welfare demonstration was temporary, a three-year subsidy actually covers a sizable
fraction of the working life. The responses to the experiment are therefore determined by a combination of
Hicksian and Frisch elasticities. Together, the Iceland and SSP simulations demonstrate that the RW model
over-predicts responses both at very short and medium-term frequencies.
15dividual level to fully identify a structural model. Keane and Rogerson (2010) argue that
obtaining consistent structural estimates from wage variation over the life cycle requires ac-
counting for a broad range of factors such as human capital accumulation (Imai and Keane
2004), credit constraints (Domeij and Floden 2006), and uninsurable risks (Low 2005). More-
over, structural models typically rely on strong exclusion restrictions for identi￿cation.23 The
quasi-experimental studies we consider here exploit variation that is orthogonal to wage rates
and thus are more robust to the biases emphasized by Keane and Rogerson. The exclusion
restriction underlying these studies is that the di⁄erential changes in tax rates across groups
is not correlated with unobserved determinants of employment rates, typically a weaker as-
sumption than those required for full identi￿cation of a structural model.24
Table 1 summarizes extensive margin elasticity estimates from ￿fteen quasi-experimental
studies. The calculations underlying the estimates and standard errors are described in
Appendix B. We calculate the extensive margin labor supply elasticity as the change in log
employment rates divided by the change in log net-of-tax wage rates. Employment rates are
typically de￿ned as working at any point during the year, though there are some di⁄erences
across studies as described in the appendix. We use the authors￿preferred estimate whenever
possible. For studies that do not report such an estimate, we construct elasticities from
reported estimates of changes in participation and calculations of the change in net-of-average-
tax wage rates. We use the delta method to calculate standard errors in such cases.
The studies summarized in Table 1 report labor supply elasticities for various countries
and subgroups using many di⁄erent sources of variation. Yet the elasticity estimates exhibit
substantial consensus. The elasticity estimates range from 0.13 to 0.43, with an overall
unweighted mean across the ￿fteen studies of 0.28. To obtain further insight into the key
patterns, we divide the studies into two groups ￿steady-state and intertemporal substitution
￿based on the type of variation they use for identi￿cation.
23Common instruments for wage rates include nonlinear age and time trends (Kimmel and Kniesner 1998) or
interactions of education and experience (Gourio and Noual 2009) conditional on individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Keane
(2010) uses years of schooling as an instrument for the wage to identify an elasticity in Eckstein and Wolpin￿ s
(1989) classic structural model. The exclusion restrictions for these instruments are that employment rates do
not vary with age conditional on wage rates or that individuals with di⁄erent levels of education do not have
di⁄erent employment trajectories over their lifecycle. If factors that predict high wage rates also predict high
latent tastes for work, the elasticity estimates would be biased upward.
24Keane (2010) and Keane and Rogerson (2010) review structural estimates and ￿nd larger values than the
quasi-experimental estimates summarized below. It would be useful to simulate the impacts of tax policy
changes in these structural models to understand why their predictions di⁄er from the reduced-form evidence.
16The ￿rst panel in Table 1 shows steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities identi￿ed from per-
manent wage changes resulting from tax reforms or long term trends in wage rates across
regions or skill-groups.25 The simplest empirical designs (e.g. Eissa and Liebman 1996) use
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approaches, while more recent studies (e.g. Meghir and Philips 2010)
combine multiple reforms over time that a⁄ect individuals di⁄erently. The mean elasticity
across the nine studies that estimate steady-state elasticities is 0.25.
The second panel in Table 1 summarizes results from studies that exploit temporary wage
changes to identify intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities. Some of these studies
exploit temporary tax changes such as the Iceland tax holiday discussed above or temporary
increases in labor demand, such as Carrington￿ s (1996) analysis of the e⁄ect of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline on Alaska￿ s labor market. Other studies analyze the impact of anticipated variation
in wages generated by pension schemes on retirement behavior. For instance, Gruber and Wise
(1999) correlate employment rates of adults near retirement with the implicit tax generated
by social security systems across OECD countries. Their analysis implies an elasticity of
0.23. Brown (2009) and Manoli and Weber (2011) estimate elasticities using the bunching of
retirements around the kinks in the budget set created by discontinuities in pension systems.
The small elasticities found by these studies implies that the fraction of individuals who are
￿at a corner with respect to the decision to retire￿(Ljungqvist and Sargent 2011) is quite large
in practice.
The mean estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity across the six studies in
Panel B is 0.32, only slightly larger than the estimates of steady-state elasticities in Panel
A. The similarity between Hicksian and Frisch elasticities is consistent with evidence that
income e⁄ects are not large enough to produce a substantial di⁄erence between intertemporal
substitution and steady-state responses.26
The elasticity estimates vary across subgroups in correspondence with their mean employ-
ment rates, as is well known from prior work (Heckman 1993, Keane and Rogerson 2010).
25Some of the studies in Panel A of Table 1 do not fully account for income e⁄ects and thus obtain estimates
that are closer to Marshallian elasticities than Hicksian elasticities. However, we can still conclude from the
mean estimates in Panels A and B of Table 1 that the Hicksian elasticity is between 0.25 and 0.32 because the
Hicksian is bounded by the Marshallian and Frisch elasticities (MaCurdy 1981).
26This does not imply that income e⁄ects are small in magnitude. Because the gap between the Frisch and
the Hicksian is proportional to the square of the income e⁄ect, even sizable income e⁄ects
d[wl]
dA produce a small
gap between the Frisch and Hicksian elasticities; see Chetty (2012) for details.
17Groups that have the weakest attachment to the labor force, such as single mothers or older
workers near retirement, are the most elastic on the extensive margin (e.g. Meyer and Rosen-
baum 2001, Gruber and Wise 1999). Among prime-age males, high rates of labor force
participation and low aggregate hours elasticities (which combine the intensive and extensive
margins) have led researchers to conclude that the extensive margin response is likely to be
quite small (see e.g., Hausman 1985 and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991). This is why most of
the studies in Table 1 focus on groups with relatively low participation rates. Hence, the mean
extensive margin elasticity in the population as a whole is likely to be below the unweighted
mean across the studies in Table 1 of 0.28.
The heterogeneity in elasticities across subgroups implies that there is no single value of
the extensive margin elasticity that can be used across applications. For instance, a recession
or tax policy change that a⁄ects prime-age males may generate smaller employment responses
in the macroeconomy than a change in incentives that a⁄ects other groups. The estimates in
Table 1 should therefore be interpreted as a rough guide to plausible targets for calibration:
they suggest that extensive margin elasticities around 0.25 are reasonable, while values above
1 are not.
6 Comparing Micro and Macro Estimates
The micro evidence points to Frisch and Hicksian extensive margin elasticities around 0.25.
Does this estimate generate aggregate hours elasticities consistent with macro evidence? The
answer to this question depends on the size of intensive margin elasticities because aggregate
hours elasticities combine extensive and intensive elasticities. We therefore begin by summa-
rizing the micro and macro evidence on both extensive and intensive margins in Table 2. The
sources and calculations underlying these estimates are described in Appendix C. The rows
of Table 2 consider steady-state (Hicksian) vs. intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities,
while the columns compare intensive margin (hours conditional on employment) and extensive
margin (participation) elasticities. Within each of the four cells, we report micro and macro
estimates of the elasticity based on (unweighted) means of existing studies. We also calcu-
late aggregate hours elasticities ￿the parameter relevant for calibrating representative agent
18models ￿by summing the extensive and intensive elasticities.27
It is important to note that there are wide con￿dence intervals associated with each of
the point estimates in Table 2, as well as ongoing methodological disputes about the validity
of some of the underlying studies (see e.g., Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2011). Therefore, the
estimates should be treated as rough values used to gauge orders of magnitude: di⁄erences
of 0.1 between elasticity estimates could well be due to noise or choice of speci￿cation, while
di⁄erences of 1 likely re￿ ect fundamental discrepancies. We consider the evidence on steady-
state and intertemporal elasticities in turn.
Steady-State. On the extensive margin, our rough estimate of the steady state elasticity
from the micro literature is the mean of the estimates in Panel A of Table 1, which is 0.25. On
the intensive margin, Chetty (2012) presents a meta-analysis of micro estimates of Hicksian
elasticities and reports a mean value of 0.15 (Chetty 2012, Table 1). However, Chetty argues
that these elasticities are attenuated by optimization frictions: the small tax changes used to
identify micro elasticities do not generate substantial changes in hours because the adjustment
costs agents have to pay to change hours outweigh the second-order bene￿ts of reoptimization.
Chetty develops a bounding method of recovering the underlying structural elasticity relevant
for evaluating the steady-state impacts of taxes. Pooling the 15 studies he analyzes (Table 1,
Panels A and B), he obtains a preferred estimate of the structural intensive margin Hicksian
elasticity of 0.33.28
Macro steady-state estimates are obtained from comparisons across countries with di⁄erent
tax regimes. Nickell (2003) and Davis and Henrekson (2005) ￿nd extensive steady-state
elasticities of 0.13 and 0.14, respectively, by regressing log employment-population ratios on
log mean net-of-tax rates across countries. Prescott￿ s (2004) tax data coupled with measures of
labor force participation rates implies an extensive steady-state elasticity of 0.25 (see Appendix
C). Our rough estimate of the steady state extensive margin elasticity from the macro literature
27For micro studies, this calculation requires that preferences are homogenous across the population. If
groups that work few hours have higher extensive elasticities, as suggested by existing evidence, this calculation
yields an upper bound on the aggregate hours elasticity (Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque 2011).
28Our proposed elasticities of 0.33 on the intensive margin and 0.26 on the extensive margin may appear
to contradict the common view that tax changes have smaller short-run e⁄ects on the intensive margin than
extensive margin. Chetty (2009) argues that the structural intensive margin elasticity relevant for long-
run comparisons is larger than the structural extensive margin elasticity once one accounts for frictions. In
particular, he shows that frictions attenuate observed extensive margin elasticities much less than intensive
margin elasticities because the utility gains from reoptimizing are ￿rst-order on the extensive margin and
second-order on the intensive margin.
19is the mean of the estimates from these three studies, which is 0.17. Davis and Henrekson
(2005) estimate a steady-state intensive elasticity of 0.20 by regressing log hours conditional
on employment on log net-of-tax rates. As noted above, Prescott￿ s (2004) data produces a
steady-state aggregate hours elasticity of 0.7; subtracting the extensive margin macro elasticity
of 0.25 produced from Prescott￿ s data therefore implies an intensive steady-state elasticity of
0.46. The mean intensive margin elasticity implied by Prescott and Davis and Henrekson￿ s
analysis is 0.33, which we use as our estimate of the macro intensive margin elasticity.
We conclude that micro and macro estimates of steady state aggregate hours elasticities
match once one accounts for extensive margin responses and optimization frictions.29 Figure
2a illustrates the agreement by plotting log of hours per adult vs. log net-of-tax rates using
the same cross-country data as Prescott (2004). The solid green line shows the best ￿t to
Prescott￿ s data, which generates a Hicksian elasticity of 0.7 as noted in Section 2. The dashed
red line shows the relationship predicted by our preferred estimate of the micro aggregate
hours elasticity of 0.58 from Table 2 (with the intercept chosen to match the mean values
in the data). The similarity of the two lines illustrates the concordance between micro and
macro estimates of steady-state elasticities.
Intertemporal Substitution. On the extensive margin, our preferred micro estimate of
the intertemporal elasticity is the mean of the estimates in Panel B of Table 1, which is
0.32. On the intensive margin, there is less quasi-experimental evidence on intertemporal
substitution elasticities. Bianchi et al. (2001) ￿nd an intensive-margin elasticity from the
Iceland reform of 0.37 (see Chetty (2012) for the elasticity calculation using Bianchi et al.￿ s
estimates). Pistaferri (2003) reports a Frisch intensive elasticity of 0.7 using microdata on
expectations about wages. The mean of these two estimates is 0.54. It is not surprising
that these estimates of the intensive Frisch elasticity are only slightly larger than our preferred
estimate of the intensive Hicksian elasticity of 0.33. Chetty (2012) shows that the Frisch
elasticity must be less than 0.47 given a Hicksian elasticity of 0.33 in an intensive-margin
model with balanced growth and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
below 1. Utility speci￿cations that generate a Frisch elasticity that is much larger than the
29The similarity between micro and macro estimates may be surprising given the institutional and regulatory
di⁄erences across countries (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005). However, institutions and regulations can
partly be interpreted as sources of optimization frictions, which we account for using Chetty￿ s (2009) bounding
procedure.
20Hicksian elasticity are inconsistent with micro estimates of income e⁄ects and elasticities of
intertemporal substitution of consumption.
Equilibrium macro models identify intertemporal substitution labor supply elasticities from
￿ uctuations in hours over the business cycle. Most macro studies calibrate representative
agent models and therefore report only intertemporal elasticities of aggregate hours. The
intertemporal aggregate hours elasticity required to match business cycle data ranges from
2.6 to 4 in real business cycle models (Cho and Cooley 1994, Table 1; King and Rebelo 1999,
p975). Table 2 reports the mean intertemporal aggregate hours elasticities implied by these
numbers, 3.31.30 Micro estimates imply a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours of 0.86, well
below the values implied by RBC models.
The few available decompositions of macro aggregate hours elasticities into extensive and
intensive margins suggest that macro estimates are roughly in alignment with micro estimates
on the intensive margin. Business cycle ￿ uctuations in hours conditional on employment
account for only 1/6 of the ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours at an annual level (Heckman 1984).
Given that elasticities of 2.6 to 4 ￿t the ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours, we infer that intensive
Frisch elasticities around 0.43 to 0.66 would match macro evidence in RBC models. These
values are modestly larger than the intensive intertemporal elasticity of 0.5 implied by micro
evidence.
In contrast, macro evidence sharply contradicts micro estimates of the extensive intertem-
poral elasticity. The fact that employment ￿ uctuations account for 5/6 of the ￿ uctuation in
aggregate hours suggests that extensive elasticities of 2.18 to 3.33 would be needed to match
the data in standard RBC models.31 If the RBC models considered in Table 2 were calibrated
to match an intensive intertemporal elasticity of 0.54, they would require extensive intertem-
poral elasticities of 3.31-0.54 = 2.77 on average to match aggregate hours ￿ uctuations. This
value is an order of magnitude larger than all of the micro estimates in Table 1.
30An earlier version of this table (Chetty et al. 2011b) included an estimate 1.92 from Smets and Wouters
(2007) when computing the macro estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity. While Smets and
Wouters report an estimate of 1.92, in personal correspondence they noted that the correct elasticity implied
by their model is the reciprocal of the reported estimate,
1
1:92 = 0:52. This elasticity is much lower than
traditional models because of a large number of frictions including wage and price rigidities, which make the
Smets and Wouters paper signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the pure equilibrium macro models discussed here. We
thank Susan Yang for pointing out this correction.
31Cho and Cooley (1994) decompose the aggregate hours elasticity in their RBC model into intensive and
extensive margins using a di⁄erent methodology. Their analysis generates an extensive Frisch elasticity of 1.61.
21We conclude that extensive labor supply responses are not large enough to explain ob-
served ￿ uctuations in employment rates at business cycle frequencies. This result is illustrated
in Figure 2b. The solid blue line in the ￿gure shows ￿ uctuations in employment rates over the
business cycle in the U.S. It plots the log deviation of employment (measured using house-
hold surveys) from a Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered trend. The dashed red line shows predicted
employment ￿ uctuations due to labor supply using our preferred micro estimate of the exten-
sive margin Frisch elasticity of 0.32. The prediction is constructed by multiplying the Frisch
elasticity of 0.32 by log deviations in real wages from a Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered trend. The
￿ uctuations in the data are much larger than the prediction based on micro evidence, illustrat-
ing that ￿ uctuations in labor supply account for only a small share of observed employment
￿ uctuations over the business cycle.
The size of the ￿ uctuations in the micro prediction may be attenuated because of compo-
sition bias in the BLS wage series. Barsky, Solon and Parker (1994) argue that actual wages
are approximately twice as volatile as observed wages because of changes in the composition
of employed workers. With this adjustment, one would need an aggregate hours elasticity of
3:31=2 = 1:66 to ￿t the macro data. While accounting for composition bias helps reduce the
gap substantially, it does not fully reconcile the discrepancy between the macro business cycle
data and predictions based on micro evidence.
Heterogeneity. As emphasized by Dyrda et al. (2012), macro models may not exactly
match micro evidence on the extensive margin because of heterogeneity in elasticities across
subgroups. However, observable heterogeneity in elasticities if anything reinforces the main
conclusions drawn above. The heterogeneity in extensive margin responses across groups
documented in Table 1 mirrors the heterogeneity observed in extensive margin responses when
comparing steady-state behavior across countries with di⁄erent tax regimes. In particular,
individuals near retirement and secondary earners exhibit the largest di⁄erences in employment
rates across countries with di⁄erent tax systems (Rogerson and Wallenius 2007, Blundell,
Bozio, and Laroque 2011).
In contrast, heterogeneity ampli￿es the discrepancy between micro and macro estimates
of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Employment rates ￿ uctuate substantially over the
business cycle even for this subgroup (Clark and Summers 1981, Jaimovich and Siu 2009).
This is illustrated by the dashed black series in Figure 2b, which plots detrended employment
22for males aged 25-55. Fluctuations in employment for prime age males are very similar to those
for the population as a whole. However, microeconomic studies clearly show that extensive
margin elasticities are near zero for prime-age males. The sharp divergence between micro
and macro Frisch elasticities within this subgroup reinforces our conclusion that indivisible
labor supply cannot fully account for the ￿ uctuations in aggregate hours over the business
cycle.32
7 Conclusion
Indivisible labor is a central feature of many modern macroeconomic models that seek to
explain aggregate ￿ uctuations in labor utilization using labor supply. From a qualitative
perspective, microeconometric evidence strongly supports the importance of indivisible labor:
changes in wage rates clearly induce extensive-margin responses. From a quantitative per-
spective, observed extensive margin responses are adequate to explain the gap between micro
and macro estimates of steady-state elasticities when combined with factors such as frictions.
However, extensive margin labor supply responses are not large enough to explain the gap
between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Consequently,
explanations of the business cycle based on changes in labor supply can only partly explain
￿ uctuations in hours over the business cycle.
One interpretation of our analysis is that it points in favor of recent macro models that
feature a cyclical ￿labor wedge￿between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for
leisure and the marginal product of labor. The micro evidence reviewed here is consistent
with macro evidence that labor wedges are substantial (Chari et al 2007; Shimer, 2009). Our
conclusion that labor supply is important but cannot entirely account for ￿ uctuations over
the business cycle supports models that combine a labor supply margin with other sources
of ￿ uctuations. For instance, Hall (2009) shows that a search-and-matching-generated un-
employment margin combined with a labor supply margin can match observed ￿ uctuations
32Fluctuations in wage rates for prime age males are very similar to those for the population as a whole at
business cycle frequencies. To illustrate this, we use CPS data on median usual weekly earnings for full time
employed wage and salary workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (series LEU0252881500) and men aged
25-54 (series LEU0252888100), available from 2000 to 2011. We adjust for in￿ ation using the CPI provided
by the BLS aggregated to a quarterly frequency and HP ￿lter the logs of the CPI-adjusted wage series with a
smoothing parameter of 1600. The resulting standard deviation of log real wages around the HP ￿ltered trend
is .0122 for the full population and .0123 for prime aged men.
23in employment rates over the business cycle without requiring large extensive margin labor
supply responses.33 Models that generate unemployment by taking individuals o⁄ their labor
supply curve in the short run, e.g. due to wage rigidities, are also consistent with our results.
While our analysis does not distinguish between alternative explanations of the labor wedge,
our estimates could be used to calibrate the labor supply component of models that seek to
explain aggregate ￿ uctuations with labor wedges.
Based on our reading of the micro evidence, we recommend calibrating macro models to
match Hicksian elasticities of 0.3 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin and Frisch
elasticities of 0.5 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin.34;35 These elasticities are
consistent with the observed di⁄erences in aggregate hours across countries with di⁄erent tax
systems. They also match the relatively small ￿ uctuations in hours conditional on employment
over the business cycle. The remaining challenge is to formulate models that ￿t the large
￿ uctuations in employment rates over the business cycle when calibrated to match an extensive
margin labor supply elasticity of 0.25. Even with indivisible labor, models that require a Frisch
elasticity of aggregate hours above 1 are inconsistent with micro evidence.
33In Hall￿ s model, workers choose both hours and employment based on both standard labor supply factors
and the time and e⁄ort needed to ￿nd a job as in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with rigid wages.
These forces generate an aggregate hours elasticity of 1.9 even with an intensive Frisch elasticity of 0.7.
34That is, one should choose a reservation wage distribution such that a 10% increase in the net-of-tax wage
leads to a 2.5% increase in employment rates. More generally, simulating quasi-experiments such as the tax
policy changes analyzed here would be a simple way to evaluate which macro models are consistent with micro
data.
35We suspect that this estimate is, if anything, biased upward for two reasons: (1) the mean extensive margin
elasticity for the population as a whole is less than 0.25 as noted above and (2) publication bias drives micro
studies toward reporting higher elasticity estimates (Card and Krueger 1995).
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29Appendix A. Simulations of Quasi-Experiments (Figure 1)
This appendix describes the simulations of three quasi-experiments in the Rogerson and
Wallenius (2009) model and the robustness of the simulations to alternative assumptions about
the intensive margin labor supply elasticity. The technical appendix describes the analytic
solution method in detail.
Calibration. The target values used to calibrate the model￿ s parameters f￿;e1;￿ h;￿g are
described in the main text. In choosing the fraction of life worked (f) for the calibration, we
use the frequency at which employment is measured in the data. For instance, in the EITC
simulation we calculate labor force participation in a given year as whether an individual
worked at all in the past year to match the annual employment observation CPS. Because
of this, the fraction of life worked at any given instant (f) di⁄ers slightly from the stated
target value. To calibrate f￿;e1;￿ h;￿g, we set ￿ = 1
"INT to match the target for the intensive
Frisch elasticity. We then calibrate the remaining parameters using the model￿ s equilibrium
conditions. Finally, we manually adjust e1 to match wR=wmax, following RW.
Experiment 1: Tax Holiday in Iceland. Bianchi et al.￿ s data is the ratio of the total
number of weeks worked to the potential supply of weeks that could have been worked by
all working-age individuals in a given calendar year. We de￿ne labor force participation
by whether a generation works in a given week. We then average across weeks for each
calendar year to get an annual measure comparable to Bianchi et al.￿ s data. With "INT = :5,
f = 79:2%, hmax = :45, and wR=wmax = 1=2, the calibrated values are ￿ = 2; ￿ h = :384,
￿ = 10:106, and e1 = :593. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity
of 2.085 and a Frisch labor force participation elasticity of 1.773. These and all subsequent
reported Frisch elasticities are calculated by simulating a temporary, small tax change using
the same methodology as the Iceland and Canada SSP simulations; see the technical appendix
for details. The parameter values generate a compensated aggregate hours elasticity of .663, a
compensated labor force participation elasticity of .577, and a compensated intensive margin
hours elasticity of .144. These and all subsequent reported compensated elasticities are
calculated by comparing the steady state change in response to a small tax change; see the
technical appendix for details. After the tax change, the maximum hours worked over the life
cycle are .737 and the minimum hours worked are .570.
Experiment 2: SSP Welfare Demonstration in Canada. We generate the e⁄ective tax
rates for the treatment and control groups of the SSP welfare demonstration in Canada using
information on the hypothetical income of the average individual in the treatment group from
Lin et al. (1998). Lin et al. use a wage regression to estimate that the predicted wage of the
average individual in the treatment group is $6:24 per hour for individuals in British Columbia
and $5:53 per hour for individuals in New Brunswick. Lin et al. then present in Table G.2
an itemized calculation of the average treatment group individual￿ s income accounting for
taxes and other transfers under the SSP subsidy and for an individual on the standard Income
Assistance (IA) welfare program. This is called hypothetical income because they use the
hourly wage rate and assume the individual works 30 hours per week for 52 weeks per year in
both cases.
Using this calculation, in New Brunswick an individual receiving the SSP subsidy would
make $20;184 per year net of taxes and transfers, while an individual working and receiving IA
would make $14;847 per year. If the individual did not work at all and took IA, they would
not realize their earnings of $8;627 but would have an IA payment that is $6;117 higher. This
30re￿ ects the almost dollar-for-dollar reduction of welfare payments of earnings above $2;400.
The individual￿ s income would have been $12;337 if they had not worked. The additional
income from working 1;560 hours per year is thus $2;510 for an individual on IA and $7;847
for an individual receiving the SSP subsidy. This implies an hourly wage rate of $1:61 on
IA and an e⁄ective tax rate of 70:9% under IA. Under SSP, however, the hourly wage rate is
$5:03 and the e⁄ective tax rate is 9:04%.
Similarly, for an individual in British Columbia, an individual receiving the SSP subsidy
would make $28;267 per year net of taxes and transfers, while an individual working and
receiving IA would make $23;078 per year. If the individual did not work at all and took
IA, they would not realize their earnings of $9;734 but would have an IA payment that is
$7;557 higher. The individual￿ s income would have been $20;901 if they had not worked.
The additional income from working 1;560 hours per year is thus $2;177 for an individual on
IA and $7;366 for an individual receiving the SSP subsidy. This implies an hourly wage rate
of $1:40 on IA and an e⁄ective tax rate of 77:6% under IA. Under SSP, however, the hourly
wage rate is $4:72 and the e⁄ective tax rate is 24:3%.
Averaging the British Columbia and New Brunswick results together (as roughly half the
sample resides in each area), an average single parent with one child in the control group
faced e⁄ective average tax rates of 74:3% when moving from no work to full-time work at the
minimum wage. An average individual in the treatment group faced e⁄ective average tax
rates of 16:7% for the same change.
Card and Hyslop observe employment rates at a monthly frequency for 53 months starting
from the month of random assignment. To replicate this data as closely as possible, we
de￿ne labor force participation by whether a generation works in a given month. Generating
wR=wmax = 1=2 would require e1 < 0. We therefore set e1 = 0, generating wR=wmax = :615.
With "INT = :5, f = 23:25%, and hmax = :45, the calibrated values are ￿ = 2, ￿ h = :263,
and ￿ = 38:378. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 3.294
and a participation Frisch elasticity of 3.016. The compensated aggregate hours elasticity is
.765, the compensated participation elasticity is .705, and the compensated intensive margin
hours elasticity is .109. After the tax change, the maximum hours worked are .746 and the
minimum hours worked are .394.
Finally, the vast majority of individuals in the SSP sample were between the ages of 16
and 46, corresponding to the ￿rst half of life in our model. Consequently, in our simulation
we only consider individuals in the ￿rst half of their life, corresponding to ages 16 to 46 out
of a 60-year working life from 16 to 76.
Experiment 3: Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. The e⁄ective tax rates for the 1994
EITC expansion come from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Table 2: the gain from working for
a single mother, which includes changes in wages, welfare, Medicaid, and taxes as a result of
the labor supply decision, was $8;943 in 1992 and $10;245 in 1996. This is relative to wages
of $18;165, generating e⁄ective tax rates of 50:8% in 1992 to 43:6% in 1996.
Meyer (2010) observes employment rates at an annual level using CPS data. To adjust
for observables and secular time trends, Meyer regresses employment rates on observables,
year dummies, and year ￿ number of children dummies and plots the coe¢ cients on the year
￿ number of children dummies in Figure 2. We plot the di⁄erence between the no children
dummies and a weighted average of the one child and two child dummies, using the weights
reported in Table 6 of Meyer (2010). We then add the di⁄erence between the dummies and
raw labor force participation rates for one- and two-child mothers to arrive at the series plotted
31in Figure 1c.
To replicate the data as closely as possible, in the simulations we de￿ne labor force partici-
pation by whether a generation works in a given month. Because of this, we use a target value
of f = :758 rather than f = :791 as in the data. With f = :758 at each instant, the fraction
of individuals working in each year before the quasi-experiment is approximately 79:1%. Be-
cause most single mothers are under 45, in our simulation we only consider individuals in the
￿rst half of their life, corresponding to simulated ages of 16 to 46 out of a 60-year simulated
working life from 16 to 76.
With "INT = :5, f = 68:7%, hmax = :45, and wR=wmax = 1=2, the calibrated values
are ￿ = 2; ￿ h = :247, ￿ = 22:871, and e1 = :574. These parameter values generate a
Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 2.125 and a Frisch participation elasticity of 1.814. The
compensated aggregate hours elasticity is .691, the compensated participation elasticity is .608,
and the compensated intensive margin hours elasticity is .144. Maximum hours worked after
the tax change are .460 and minimum hours worked are .370.
Robustness. We now evaluate the robustness of the results to calibrating to an intensive
margin Frisch elasticity of "INT = :25.
For the Iceland simulation, the calibrated values are ￿ = 4, ￿ h = :509, and ￿ = 32:861.
These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 1.897 and a Frisch
participation elasticity of 1.738. With these parameters, labor force participation jumps
13.3%, rather than 13.5% as presented in the main text. Maximum hours worked after the
tax change are .719 and minimum hours worked are .636.
For the Canada SSP simulation, the calibrated values are ￿ = 4, ￿ h = :337, and ￿ = 306:149.
As above we set e1 = 0, which generates wR=wmax = :611. These parameter values generate a
Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 3.089 and a participation Frisch elasticity of 2.949. With
these parameters, labor force participation jumps from 23.5% to 76.3% one year after the
subsidy is introduced. After the tax change, maximum hours worked are .585 and minimum
hours worked are .421.
For the U.S. EITC simulation, the calibrated values are ￿ = 4; ￿ h = :327, ￿ = 179:957, and
e1 = :581. These parameter values generate a Frisch aggregate hours elasticity of 1.647 and a
participation Frisch elasticity of 1.475. With these parameters, labor force participation jumps
from 79.1% to 85.5% on impact and then rises to 85.7% over the next 4 years. Maximum
hours after the tax change are .455 and minimum hours are .409.
Calibrating to a smaller intensive Frisch elasticity of "INT = :25 thus does not change our
conclusions: the RW model over-predicts the impacts of the temporary changes in Iceland and
Canada by an order of magnitude, but is closer to matching the steady-state impact of the
EITC permanent tax change.
Appendix B. Meta-Analysis of Quasi-Experimental Estimates (Table 1)
This appendix describes how the participation elasticities and standard errors in columns
2 and 3 of Table 1 are calculated. We report standard errors based directly on the authors￿
estimates if available; if not, we use the delta method to calculate a standard error for the
numerator of the elasticity (log employment changes) based on reported standard errors for
employment e⁄ects. If information necessary for the delta method is missing, we approximate
the standard error by assuming the T-statistic on the elasticity would be the same as the
T-statistic on the author￿ s estimate.
321. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991): The partial elasticity is computed by taking a weighted
average of the estimates in column (3) of Table 9; the weights are computed as the fraction of
the population represented by each estimate using the wage percentiles listed in column (1) of
Table 9. We normalize this partial elasticity by the mean of the employment rate from 1970-89
using one minus the non-employment values reported in column (3) of Table 1. Participation
is de￿ned at the weekly level (by the fraction of weeks worked in the year). For the standard
error, the variance of the partial elasticity is computed as a weighted average of the variances
of the estimates in column (3) of Table 9 using the T-statistics reported in the same column.
We normalize this standard error using the mean of one minus the non-employment values
reported in column (3) of Table 1, assuming that non-employment is measured without error.
2. Eissa and Liebman (1996): The percentage change in participation is reported in Table
III, column (4) as 2.8% with a standard error of 0.9%. The participation rate of single mothers
is reported in Table II, column (1) as 73% with a standard error of 0.4%. The percentage
change in net earnings for the same data source is reported by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000),
Table 2, as the ￿nancial gain from working for single mothers in 1990 ($8,458) relative to
the gain from working in 1984 ($7,469). The elasticity is thus calculated as (log(0.73+0.028)-
log(0.73))/(log(8458)-log(7469)). Participation is de￿ned as positive work hours in the past
calendar year. For the standard error, the delta method is used with the additional assumption
that the ￿nancial gain in the denominator, for which there is no reported standard error, is
measured without error.
3. Graversen (1998): Table 5, elasticity of participation rate with respect to after tax wage,
average of the four reported estimates for married women and single women, bottom panel,
columns (1) and (4). The author only reports standard errors on the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
estimates in Table 4 used to calculate the elasticities in Table 5. Because complete estimates
are unavailable, we approximate the standard error of each of the four reported estimates by
assuming that the T-statistics on the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erence estimates are the same as the
T-statistic on the elasticities. We then average the four estimates as above to get the ￿nal
reported standard error.
4. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001): On page 1092, an elasticity of 1.07 for any employment
(positive work hours) during the year is reported using gross earnings of single mothers as
the base level of earnings. However, the correct denominator to calculate the percentage wage
increase is net earnings prior to the reform after accounting for taxes and transfers. Making
the correction requires multiplying the reported elasticity by the ratio of net earnings to gross
earnings prior to the reform. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000, page 1043) report that this ratio is
7270/18165, and thus the percentage increase in the wage is actually 45% rather than the 18%
assumed to calculate the elasticity reported in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000). The corrected
elasticity estimate is given by 1.07￿7270/18165=0.43. For the standard error, we recreate
the numerator used in the calculation of the 1.07 elasticity as described by the authors on
page 1091. The change in participation rate comes from the estimate in row (1), column (5)
of Table 4. Base participation in 1984 and its standard error are calculated using weighted
average of columns 6 and 7 of the ￿rst row of Table 2 with the weights calculated from number
of observations reported in the last row of column 1 and 2 in Appendix 2. An estimate of the
elasticity numerator￿ s standard error is then calculated using the delta method. Assuming that
the denominator of the elasticity and the ratio of net earnings to gross earnings are measured
without error, then the numerator has the same T-statistic as the calculated elasticity. The
reported standard error for the elasticity is calculated by dividing the elasticity (0.43) by the
33calculated numerator￿ s T-statistic.
5. Devereux (2004): Table 4, panel 2, column (1), own-wage elasticity. Participation is
de￿ned as positive work hours in the past calendar year. Standard error from same table.
6. Eissa and Hoynes (2004): Table 6, elasticity of participation with respect wages, average
estimate of married women and married men, 2nd row from bottom. Participation is de￿ned as
positive work hours in the last year. Standard errors are calculated by recreating the authors￿
elasticity calculation as described on page 1951 using estimates from Table 6 and using the
delta method. Base participation and wage rates are calculated from Table 2, using weighted
averages of the 3rd and 4th columns based on number of observations reported in the bottom
row. The reported standard error is created by combining the married women and married
men standard errors as above.
7. Liebman and Saez (2006): The numerator for the elasticity is computed as log(.483-
.012)-log(.483) using the Change in Wife Labor Force Participation reported in row (1) and
column (2) of Table 6 and the Percent of Wives with Positive Earnings (1990-1992) reported in
column (3) of Table 5. The denominator for the elasticity is computed as log(1-.419)-log(1-.31)
based on the change in tax rates reported on pages 10-11 for OBRA93. Participation is de￿ned
as an indicator for positive annual earnings in the past year. Standard error is constructed
using the delta method assuming that the change in tax rates is measured without error. This
calculation uses the standard error on Change in Wife Labor Force Participation in Table 6
and the Percent of Wives with Positive Earnings as well as the sample size from Table 5.
8. Meghir and Phillips (2010): Page 247, last paragraph, average of single and married men
in-work-income elasticities, 0.27 and 0.53 respectively. For the standard errors, the authors￿
calculations are replicated as described on page 247 using standard errors from Table 3.1, rows
(1) and (4), column (4). The standard errors are then calculated using the delta method for
each of the estimates, which are then combined to create the reported standard error.
9. Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2011): Page 38, median overall extensive elasticity. Par-
ticipation is de￿ned as positive work hours in the past calendar year. Standard error was not
reported.
10. Carrington (1996): OLS estimates from Table 2. We approximate the population-
constant employment elasticity as the di⁄erence between the employment elasticity in col-
umn (1) and the population elasticity in column (5). The standard error is calculated from
corresponding standard errors on elasticities under the assumption that the population and
employment elasticity estimates are uncorrelated.
11. Gruber and Wise (1999): Using data reported in Table 1, the elasticity estimate is
based on a regression of log(labor force participation at age 59) on log(e⁄ective net-of-tax
rate) across countries. Labor force participation is de￿ned as 1 minus fraction of Men Out of
Labor Force at age 59; e⁄ective net-of-tax rate is de￿ned as 1-implicit tax on earnings. The
Netherlands is omitted from the regression because it has an implicit tax above 1. Reported
standard error is from the same regression.
12. Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega (2001): Estimate and standard error from average of
the elasticities for men and women reported in the text, paragraph 4, page 1570. Participation
is de￿ned at the weekly level (fraction of weeks worked in the past year).
13. Card and Hyslop (2005): From Figure 3, labor force participation before the SSP
experiment is 23.6%, and the di⁄erence between the treatment and control groups during the
SSP eligibility period is 13.5%. Estimated average tax rates are computed from ￿gures in
Lin et al. (1998) as described in Appendix A. Participation is de￿ned as any employment
34in the past month. To compute standard errors, sample sizes in Table 2 adjusted for sample
attrition as described in footnote 18 were combined with the data on participation rates from
Figure 3. The delta method was then used assuming the change in net-of-tax wage rates was
measured without error.
14. Brown (2009): We obtain an estimate of 0.08 for the elasticity of retirement age with
respect to the wage using the average of the three estimates reported in column 4 of Table 2.
Footnote 33 and Section 6.1 suggest that this is the author￿ s preferred estimate. To convert
this retirement age elasticity into an elasticity of years of work with respect to the wage rate,
we follow footnote 30 and multiply the elasticity by the ratio of the mean age at retirement to
the mean years of service reported in Table 1. The resulting elasticity is 0.08￿(60.73/26.75).
Participation is de￿ned as years of work, with variation on the retirement margin. The
standard error is constructed from the same table and assumes that the ratio of mean age at
retirement to mean years of service, for which a standard error is not reported, is measured
without error.
15. Manoli and Weber (2011): Table 5, re-weighted elasticities. We ￿rst obtain separate
elasticities for men and women by taking a weighted averages of the re-weighted elasticities;
the weights are computed based on the fraction of individuals at each tenure threshold. The
elasticity for men is 0.12 and the elasticity for women is 0.38. We then take an unweighted
average of these numbers to obtain the overall elasticity of 0.25. The standard error is
constructed from the same table using the same weighted average methodology.
Appendix C. Micro vs. Macro Elasticities (Table 2)
This appendix describes how each of the values in Table 2 are calculated. With the excep-
tion of the Frisch aggregate hours macro elasticity, the aggregate hours elasticities are de￿ned
as the sums of the intensive and extensive margin elasticities.
Hicksian, extensive margin: The micro estimate is the mean of the estimates in Panel A
of Table 1. The macro estimate is computed by taking the mean of 0.13 from Davis and
Henrekson (2005), 0.14 from Nickell (2003), and 0.25 from Prescott (2004). The elasticity
from Davis and Henrekson is computed using the log di⁄erence in employment based on the
slope coe¢ cient in Table 3 (bottom panel, Sample C) and the sample means of labor force
participation and tax rates in Table 1 for the corresponding sample. The elasticity from Nickell
is computed using the average point estimate of 2 percent (reported on page 8) and the sample
means of employment rates and tax rates from Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The elasticity
from Prescott is calculated by regressing log labor force participation rates from OECD Stat
Extracts on log net-of-tax rates using the same sample of countries and years as Prescott.36
The data on tax rates is taken from Table 2 of Prescott (2004). The data on labor force
participation rates are missing for Canada and the U.K. in the 1970s and these observations
are therefore excluded.
Hicksian, intensive margin: The micro estimate is the preferred minimum-￿ estimate using
Panels A and B in Table 1 of Chetty (2012). The macro estimate is the mean of the values
reported by Davis and Henrekson (2005) and Prescott (2004). The value from Davis and
Henrekson (2005) is computed using log di⁄erences in annual hours per employed adult based
36The data are for men and women aged 15-64 for 1970-1974 and 1993-1996 in order to
match Prescott￿ s data. Data are available from OECD Stat Extracts at the following URL:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R
35on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 2.3 (middle panel, Sample C) and the sample means of annual
hours per employed person and tax rates in Table 2.1 for the corresponding sample. The
elasticity estimate can be interpreted as a compensated labor supply elasticity if government
expenditure is viewed as unearned income in the aggregate. The value from Prescott (2004)
is calculated by regressing log hours per worker on log net-of-tax rates using OECD data
reported by Prescott in Table 2 on hours per adult, which are converted to hours per worker
using labor force participation rates from the OECD Stat Extracts described above. The
data on labor force participation rates are missing for Canada and the U.K. in the 1970s and
these observations are therefore excluded. The elasticity estimate can be interpreted as a
compensated labor supply elasticity if government expenditure is viewed as unearned income
in the aggregate.
Frisch, intensive margin elasticities: the micro estimate is the unweighted mean of 0.70
in Table 2 from Pistaferri (2003) and 0.37 from Bianchi et al. (2001), as reported in Chetty
(2012). The macro value in brackets is set equal to the micro estimate.
Frisch, extensive margin: The micro estimate is the mean of the estimates in Panel B of
Table 1. The macro value in brackets is computed by subtracting the Frisch micro intensive
margin elasticity from the Frisch aggregate hours macro elasticity.
Frisch, aggregate hours macro: the estimate is computed by taking the mean of the aggre-
gate (total hours) elasticities implied by two models of business cycles: (1) Cho and Cooley
(1994): 2.61 from the sum of the intensive and extensive margin elasticities implied by the pa-
rameters in Table 2 and (2) King and Rebelo (1999): 4 for representative agent RBC models,
from page 975.
Technical Appendix
This technical appendix describes how we simulate the Rogerson and Wallenius model.
We solve the model analytically as in RW (2007), the working paper version of RW (2009).
All of our extensions follow RW￿ s solution method (with slightly modi￿ed notation). Our
results have been veri￿ed with iterative methods. The code for our simulations is available at
http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/index.html















h(a) ￿ ￿ h;0
￿
da + T
where e(a) = 1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ e1)
￿ ￿1
2 ￿ a
￿ ￿ is a tent-shaped life-cycle productivity pro￿le as shown in
Figure 1. Similar to RW, we assume that the one unit of time corresponds to 60 years. We
assume that time t = 0 corresponds to age 16, while time t = 1 corresponds to age 76. The
model can be solved iteratively by backwards induction, but given RW￿ s choice of functional
forms it can be solved analytically as well. For consistency with RW (2007), we work with
generic functions for the utility of consumption (u(c)), the disutility of labor supply (v (h)),
and e¢ ciency units of labor per hour worked (so g (h) = max
￿
h ￿ ￿ h;0
￿
above) and plug in





u(c) ￿ v (h(a))da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
0
e(a)g (h(a))da + T
36RW show that the optimal solution has two properties. First, there exists a cuto⁄ e￿ such
that h￿ (a) > 0 if e(a) > e￿ and h￿ (a) = 0 if e(a) ￿ e￿. Consequently, if e(a) is tent shaped,
there will be a date at which the individual enters the labor force and a date at which they
exit, and if e(a) is symmetric these dates will be symmetric around a = :5. Second, if h￿ (a)
is optimal and h￿ (a1) > 0 and h￿ (a2) > 0 then e(a1) > e(a2) ) h￿ (a1) ￿ h￿ (a2) so that the
individual works weakly more hours when they have higher productivity. Finally, note that
hourly wages are wh (a) = e(a)g (h(a))=h(a).
Because individuals have a discrete labor market entry and retirement date, an individual
works at all times on some interval
￿
AE;AR￿
where AE is the labor market entry date and





v (h(a))da s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z AR
AE
e(a)g (h(a))da + T
In order to solve the model, RW re-order time, so that the most productive moment is at time
0 and the least productive moment is at time 1. Formally, de￿ne ~ e(￿) for ￿ 2 [0;1] so that




I fe(a) ￿ ~ e(￿)gda
Then ~ e(￿) is the productivity level such that the individual has a productivity greater than
~ e(￿) for ￿ of their life and is strictly decreasing by construction. The maximization problem





v (h(a))d￿ s.t. c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z ￿￿
0
~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T
because it will be assumed that e(a) is symmetric around :5, if ￿￿ < 1, AE = :5 ￿ ￿￿
2 and
AR = :5 + ￿￿
2 .
Under the parameters chosen by RW and that we use in our simulations, the constraint
h(a) < 1 is always slack and can therefore be ignored. This permits an analytical solution
to the problem. Plugging in the budget constraint and di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿￿ and






0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T






0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ + T
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿)) (2)




~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿ = T




0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿




0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿)) (4)
Note that if the individual works their whole life, ￿￿ = 1 and only the second FOC will hold.
Additionally, the second (h(￿)) FOC implies that
v0 (h(￿))






= constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿￿]
This di⁄erential equation pins down the entire hours pro￿le once h(0) = hmax is known. Since
￿￿ fully pins down AE and AR, the optimum is de￿ned by two free variables, hmax and ￿￿,
pinned down by the two FOCs. If ￿￿ = 1 due to a corner solution, the second FOC will pin
down hmax, the only free variable.
The two FOCs can be manipulated to simplify the equilibrium conditions for hmax and ￿￿.







RW show that this de￿nes an increasing relationship between hmax and ￿￿. Second, evaluate
the second FOC at ￿ = 0 to get:






0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿
￿ (6)
RW show that this de￿nes a decreasing relationship between hmax and ￿. (5) and (6) thus
together de￿ne a unique equilibrium that can be solved numerically given e0, e1, ￿, ￿ h, and
￿. Figure 1 illustrates the hours pro￿le (solid green line) generated by the numerical solution
using parameter values from the EITC simulation presented in the main text alongside the
productivity pro￿le (dashed blue line).
38Appendix Figure 1: Productivity and Hours Pro￿les in the RW Model
We now plug in the functional forms u(c) = ln(c), v (h) = ￿h1+￿
1+￿ , g (h) = h ￿ ￿ h, and
to choose a functional form for ~ e(￿). RW assume a linear formulation for the productivity
pro￿le in ￿ time:
~ e(￿) = ~ e(￿) = e0 ￿ (e0 ￿ e1)￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)e0 + ￿e1











(1 + ￿)((1 ￿ ￿￿)e0 + ￿￿e1)
￿







((1 ￿ ￿)e0 + ￿e1)
￿
h(￿) ￿ ￿ h
￿
d￿ (8)
The di⁄erential equation for hours can be manipulated to obtain
h(￿) = hmax
￿















































The intensive margin Frisch elasticity, which is one of the moments we use for calibration, can
be calculated analytically. Rearranging equation (6) and plugging in the functional forms and
39normalizing e0 = 1 gives:
(1 ￿ ￿)u0 (c) = ￿(hmax)
￿





Because the hours pro￿le shifts vertically by hmax when taxes change, this is also the intensive
margin Frisch elasticity in the model. Consequently, we can calibrate the model to a particular
intensive margin Frisch elasticity "INT by choosing ￿ = 1
"INT .
The model is calibrated as described in Appendix A. With f￿;e1;￿ h;￿g chosen, the model
can be solved numerically by inverting equations (9) and (10) to solve for hmax and ￿￿.
Asset Pro￿le in the RW Model. In order to characterize the impact of unanticipated tax
changes on labor supply, we need to know assets at the time of the tax change. Because
assets and age are the only state variables, assets holdings are the time of the tax change are
adequate to solve the model.
We assume that each generation receives a lump-sum rebate equal to the taxes they pay at
each instant in time. Under this assumption, it is straightforward to back out an agent￿ s asset
position at any time. Note that the labor market entry and retirement dates are AE = :5￿ ￿￿
2
and AR = :5 + ￿￿













and so earnings when working are











(e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)j:5 ￿ aj)
while consumption is always



































￿ ￿ ￿ h
￿
(e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)j:5 ￿ aj)da, a 2
￿
AE;AR￿
￿ca + c, a > AR
40The middle term can be simpli￿ed analytically to:






















if a ￿ :5 and
















if a ￿ :5, where

























We solve each generation￿ s problem separately and then add across generations, which are
weighted equally, to simulate the overall response to our quasi-experiments.
Permanent Tax Changes. We ￿rst consider the EITC simulation of a one time permanent
tax change. Consider the problem of an age t individual with assets St as calculated in the




(1 ￿ t)u(c) ￿
Z 1
t
v (h(a))da s.t. (1 ￿ t)c = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z 1
t
e(a)g (h(a))da + T + St
This equation can be solved by analytically re-ordering time as described above in the solution
to the RW model. All the solution requires is changing the ~ e(￿) pro￿le, with ￿ 2 [0;1 ￿ t],
to re￿ ect the fact that some time has already elapsed.
The new ~ e(￿) function will be piecewise linear, as illustrated in Figure 2 using the parame-
ter values used for the EITC simulation in the main text. When t = 0, e(￿) = e0￿￿(e0 ￿ e1)
as above, illustrated by the solid blue line in Figure 2 below. As t rises, e(￿) will be piecewise
linear, as the low productivity time periods up to t will occur once, not twice. Thus e(￿) will
look the same for low ￿, but after 2t it will have twice the slope, as shown by the green dotted
line in Figure 2. When t hits :5, no productivity level occurs twice and so the function will
have twice the slope and be linear again. However emax will fall to e0 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)(t ￿ :5).
This case is illustrated by the red dash-dot line in Figure 2.
41Appendix Figure 2: Productivity Pro￿le e e(￿) For Various Values of Time of Tax Change t
Consequently, if t < :5, ~ e(￿) is
~ e(￿) =
￿
e0 ￿ ￿(e0 ￿ e1) if ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 2t
2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(t + ￿)(e0 ￿ e1) if ￿ > 1 ￿ 2t
If t > :5, ~ e(￿) is
~ e(￿) = 2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(t + ￿)(e0 ￿ e1)














The model will have an interior solution if the tax change is not large enough to induce
h > 1. We show this is not the case in our three applications by reporting maximum and
minimum hours after the tax change for each simulation in appendix A. With this constraint
slack, the model can be solved analytically. Taking the ￿rst order conditions, plugging in the
government￿ s balanced budget constraint, T =
R ￿￿
0 ~ e(￿)g (h(￿))d￿, and simplifying gives:
v (h(￿￿))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿￿)g (h(￿￿)) (11)
v0 (h(￿))
u0 (c)
= (1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿)) (12)
As in the basic RW model, the second FOC implies
v0 (h(￿))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿)g0 (h(￿))
= u0 (c) = constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿￿]
which pins down the hours pro￿le.
The two FOCs can be simpli￿ed by dividing the two FOCs to eliminate the integral and




















h(￿) ￿ ￿ h
￿
d￿ + St





￿ from the di⁄erential equation for the hours pro￿le.
The two FOC simplify to:




















￿ d￿ ￿ ￿ h
Z ￿￿
0
~ e(￿)d￿ + St (14)
which we solve numerically.
With the optimal hmax and ￿￿ in hand, it is easy to build the hours pro￿le in calendar
time. If ￿￿ < 1 ￿ 2t, the working life will be entirely after t. The individual will enter the
labor force at date AE = :5￿ ￿￿
2 and exit at date AR = :5+ ￿￿
2 . If ￿￿ > 1￿2t, the agent will
have already started working so AE = t. They will thus exit at date AR = t + ￿￿. To build
the hours pro￿le, we build a function ￿(a): if t > :5,
￿(a) = a ￿ t
and if t < :5,
￿(a) =
￿
2ja ￿ :5j if ja ￿ :5j < t
a ￿ t otherwise














Temporary Tax Changes. The solution method for Iceland and the Canada simulations ￿
both of which feature a temporary tax reduction ￿ is similar to the EITC solution. However,
now there are two di⁄erent periods in which the above problem is solved ￿ one with tax ￿0
and one with tax ￿1 ￿ and thus the solution consists of a system of four equations and four
unknowns ￿ hmax and ￿￿ in each tax regime.
Consider the problem of an age t individual with assets St. From t to ￿ t they face a tax
rate ￿0, and then the tax rate changes to ￿1. In this section, we assume that ￿ t < 1, as if ￿ t ￿ 1
the individual only faces ￿0 the rest of their life and the problem reduces to the EITC problem
43described above. With perfect consumption smoothing, the individual￿ s problem is:
max
c;h(a)




s.t. (1 ￿ t)c = (1 ￿ ￿0)
Z ￿ t
t
e(a)g (h(a))da + (1 ￿ ￿1)
Z 1
￿ t
e(a)g (h(a))da + T + St
Again re-order time as in RW. There will now be two ~ e(￿) functions: ~ e0 (￿0) with ￿0 2 [0;￿ t ￿ t]
in the period with taxes ￿0 and ~ e1 (￿1) with ￿1 2 [0;1 ￿ ￿ t] in the period with taxes ￿1. ~ e1 (￿1)
will look exactly as in the EITC simulation, with ￿ t replacing t: if ￿ t < :5,
~ e1 (￿1) =
￿
e0 ￿ ￿1 (e0 ￿ e1) if ￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ 2￿ t
2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(￿ t + ￿1)(e0 ￿ e1) if ￿1 > 1 ￿ 2￿ t
and if ￿ t ￿ :5,
~ e1 (￿1) = 2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(￿ t + ￿1)(e0 ￿ e1)
As for ~ e0 (￿0), if ￿ t ￿ :5, then the area between t and ￿ t will only have the increasing side of the
absolute value function:
~ e0 (￿0) = e0 ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿ t + 2￿0)(e0 ￿ e1)
Similarly, if t ￿ :5, the the area between t and ￿ t will only have the decreasing side of the
absolute value function:
~ e0 (￿0) = 2e0 ￿ e1 ￿ 2(e0 ￿ e1)(t + ￿0)
If t < :5 and ￿ t > :5, then we will have part of the absolute value function in the ~ e0. Let
t = minf￿ t ￿ :5;:5 ￿ tg. Then
~ e0 (￿0) =
￿
e0 ￿ ￿0 (e0 ￿ e1) if ￿0 ￿ 2t
e0 + 2t(e0 ￿ e1) ￿ 2￿0 (e0 ￿ e1) if ￿0 > 2t
With these pro￿les in hand, we note that under each tax regime an individual will always















In this case, the model may not have an interior solution as an agent may ￿nd it optimal to
work all of the time for which the tax is ￿0. We describe how we handle these corner solutions
below.



















= (1 ￿ ￿1) ~ e1 (￿1)g0 (h1 (￿1))
The second FOC implies that:
v0 (h0 (￿0))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿0)g0 (h0 (￿0))
= u0 (c)
= constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿￿
0]
As before once we know h0 (0) = hmax
0 all of h0 (￿0) is pinned down. Similarly, the fourth
FOC implies that:
v0 (h1 (￿1))
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ e(￿1)g0 (h1 (￿1))
= u0 (c) = constant 8 ￿ 2 [0;￿￿
1]
We can then follow the same steps as above, dividing the two FOCs and evaluating at
￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 0 and evaluating the second and fourth FOCs at ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 0,
respectively. Plugging in the functional forms one gets four equilibrium conditions:
hmax



























































~ e(￿1)d￿1 + St
(1 ￿ ￿1)emax



































~ e(￿1)d￿1 + St
These four equations hold for interior solutions: ￿￿
0 2 (0;￿ t ￿ t) and ￿￿
1 2 (0;1 ￿ ￿ t). They also
work at the ￿￿
0 = 0 and ￿￿
1 = 0 corner solutions because then the hours problem is trivial. At
the ￿￿
0 = ￿ t ￿ t corner solution, ￿￿
1, hmax
0 , and hmax
1 are pinned down by the second, third, and
fourth FOCs. At the ￿￿
1 = 1 ￿ ￿ t corner solution, ￿￿
0, hmax
0 , and hmax
1 are pinned down by the
45￿rst, third and fourth FOCs. If both ￿￿
1 and ￿￿
0 are at corner solutions, only the third and
fourth FOCs apply. In each case, we solve the general four equation system and then proceed
to the corner solution cases if ￿￿
0 or ￿￿
1 are not in the correct intervals. There may also be
a corner solution for hours if h0 (￿0) > 1 for some ￿0; this case is considered separately in a
subsequent section.
Having solved for ￿￿
0, ￿￿
1, hmax
0 , and hmax
1 , we can then calculate retirement dates and build
the hours pro￿le. Let AE
i be the labor market entry date and AR
i be the labor market exit date
under tax system i. If ￿￿
1 < 1￿2￿ t, the working life will be entirely after ￿ t. The individual will
enter the labor force at date AE
1 = :5 ￿ ￿￿
2 and exit at date AR
1 = :5 + ￿￿
2 . If ￿￿
1 > 1 ￿ 2￿ t, the
agent will have already started working so AE
1 = ￿ t. They will thus exit at date AR
1 = ￿ t + ￿￿.
As for ￿￿
0, if ￿￿
0 = 0 the worker does not work between t and ￿ t. If ￿ t < :5, then AE
0 = ￿ t￿￿￿
0 and
AR
0 = ￿ t. If t > :5, then AE
0 = t and AR
0 = t + ￿￿
0. If t < :5 and ￿ t > :5, there are three cases.
If :5 ￿ t < ￿ t ￿ :5, there are two cases: if 2￿0 < :5￿ t then AE









0 = t and AR
0 = t + ￿0. If :5 ￿ t ￿ ￿ t ￿ :5, there are two cases: if 2￿0 < ￿ t ￿ :5 then
AE








0 = ￿ t ￿ ￿0 and AR
0 = ￿ t.
In order to build the hours pro￿le, we proceed as in the EITC section and build a ￿(a)
function. ￿1 (a) looks the same as ￿(a) in the EITC simulation with t replacing ￿ t. For ￿0 (a),
if ￿ t < :5,
￿0 (a) = ￿ t ￿ a
if t > :5,
￿0 (a) = a ￿ t
If t < :5 and ￿ t > :5, there are two cases: if :5 ￿ t < ￿ t ￿ :5,
￿0 (a) =
￿
2ja ￿ :5j if a < 1 ￿ t
a ￿ t otherwise
and if :5 ￿ t > ￿ t ￿ :5
￿0 (a) =
￿
2ja ￿ :5j if a > 1 ￿ ￿ t
￿ t ￿ a otherwise
The hours pro￿le can then be generated from the ￿0 (a) and ￿1 (a) functions as with a perma-
nent tax change.
Calculating Elasticities. The elasticities reported in the text and appendix A are con-
structed by simulation. For all of the simulations, we compare labor supply under the pre-
quasi-experimental tax regime ￿ to labor supply under a tax regime of ￿ ￿:01 to approximate
an in￿nitesimal tax change. Denoting hours under the two tax regimes by h1 and h2, respec-












To calculate the Frisch elasticities, we treat the tax change from ￿ to ￿￿:01 as a temporary
tax change lasting 1
6;000 units of time using 6,000 generations to approximate a tax change for
an in￿nitesimal moment. Our reported elasticities are thus an approximation to an experiment
46in which net-of-tax wages are raised by dw for a time period dt. We report three intertemporal
substitution elasticities: the intensive margin Frisch elasticity, which we know will be 1
￿ from
the derivation above, a participation Frisch elasticity, and an aggregate hours Frisch elasticity.
For the aggregate hours elasticity, h1 and h2 are aggregate hours. For the participation
elasticity, h1 and h2 are labor force participation rates. For the intensive margin elasticity
h1 and h2 are aggregate hours for generations that would have supplied labor in the period of
the tax change if the tax change had not occurred.
To calculate compensated elasticities, we compare the model￿ s steady state under a tax
regime of ￿ and a tax regime of ￿ ￿:01. Our reported elasticities are thus an approximation to
an experiment in which net-of-tax wages are raised permanently by dw and agents￿unearned
income is reduced by a commensurate amount. We report three elasticities: the intensive
margin compensated elasticity, the participation compensated elasticity, and the aggregate
hours compensated elasticity, which are computed in the same manner as described in the
previous paragraph.
Aggregation Over Generations. The analytical methods above are used to solve for the
labor supply of a given generation. We aggregate over generations to calculate the impacts of
a tax change on aggregate labor supply. To approximate a continuous time environment in
which a new generation is born every instant, we use numerical simulations with a large number
of generations. In particular, we project the analytical solution onto a discrete-time grid for
each generation, with one generation born every time period. For the Iceland simulation, we
use 9,360 generations, so three generations are born or die each week. For the Canada SSP
simulation, we use 7,200 generations, so 10 generations are born or die each month. For the
EITC simulation, we use 6,000 generations, so 100 generations are born or die each year. We
then bin the data to report the fraction of the population that worked at any point in the last
week (for Iceland), month (for Canada), or year (for EITC), so that we are consistent with the
quasi-experimental data. For the EITC simulation, we then aggregate up to years to re￿ ect
Bianchi et al.￿ s data.
47Study Elasticity
Standard 
Error Population and Variation
A. Steady State (Hicksian) Elasticities
1. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) 0.13 0.02 Men, skill-specific trends, 1971-1990
2. Eissa and Liebman (1996) 0.30 0.10 Single Mothers, U.S. 1984-1990
3. Graversen (1998) 0.24 0.04 Women, Denmark 1986 tax reform
4. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) 0.43 0.05 Single Women, U.S. Welfare Reforms 1985-1997
5. Devereux (2004) 0.17 0.17 Married Women, U.S. wage trends 1980-1990
6. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) 0.15 0.07 Low-Income Married Men & Women, U.S. EITC expansions 1984-1996 
7. Liebman and Saez (2006) 0.15 0.30 Women Married to High Income Men, U.S. tax reforms 1991-97
8. Meghir and Phillips (2010) 0.40 0.08 Low-Education Men, U.K. wage trends, 1994-2004 
9. Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2011) 0.30 n/a Prime-age Men and Women, U.K., tax reforms 1978-2007
     Unweighted Mean 0.25
B. Intertemporal Substitution (Frisch) Elasticities
10. Carrington (1996)  0.43 0.08 Full Population of Alaska, Trans-Alaska Pipline, 1968-83
11. Gruber and Wise (1999) 0.23 0.07 Men, Age 59, variation in social security replacement rates
12. Bianchi, Gudmunndsson, and Zoega (2001) 0.42 0.07 Iceland 1987 zero tax year
13. Card and Hyslop (2005) 0.38 0.03 Single Mothers, Canadian Self Sufficiency Project
14. Brown (2009) 0.18 0.01 Teachers Near Retirement, California Pension System Cutoffs
15. Manoli and Weber (2011) 0.25 0.01 Workers Aged 55-70, Austria severance pay discontinuities
     Unweighted Mean 0.32
TABLE 1
Notes: This table reports elasticities of employment rates with respect to wages, defined as the log change in employment rates divided by the log change in 
net-of-tax wages.  Where possible, we report elasticities from the authors' preferred specification.  When estimates are available for multiple populations or 
for multiple specifications without a stated preference among them, we report an unweighted mean of the relevant elasticities.  See Appendix B for details on 
sources of estimates.
Extensive Margin Elasticity Estimates from Quasi-Experimental StudiesIntensive Margin Extensive Margin Aggregate Hours
micro 0.33 0.25 0.58
macro 0.33 0.17 0.50
micro 0.54 0.32 0.86




Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities
TABLE 2
Notes: Each cell shows a point estimate of the relevant elasticity based on meta analyses of existing
micro and macro evidence. Micro estimates are identified from quasi-experimental studies; macro
estimates are identified from cross-country variation in tax rates (steady state elasticities) and
business cycle fluctuations (intertemporal substitution elasticities). The aggregate hours elasticity is
defined as the sum of the extensive and intensive elasticities. Macro studies report intertemporal
aggregate hours elasticities but do not always decompose these values into extensive and intensive
elasticities. Therefore, the estimates in brackets show the values implied by the macro aggregate
hours elasticity if the intensive Frisch elasticity is chosen to match the micro estimate of 0.54. See
Appendix C for sources of these estimates.FIGURE 1
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(b) SSP Welfare Experiment in Canada
Months Relative to Start of Experiment
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(c) 1994 EITC Expansion in the United States
Notes: Each panel shows the impact of an unanticipated change in incentives to work on employment
rates. The red dashed series shows the impact predicted by the calibrated Rogerson and Wallenius (2009)
model, while the blue solid series shows the impact observed in the data. Panel (a): Iceland suspended its
income tax for one year in 1987. Average tax rates in Iceland changed from 14.5% in 1986 to 0% in 1987
and then 8.0% in 1988. Following Bianchi et al. (2001), we define the employment rate as the fraction of
weeks worked in a given year in the adult population. This panel plots annual changes in employment
rates. Panel (b): The Canadian SSP demonstration randomly assigned a group of welfare recipients a
wage subsidy for 36 months in the early 1990s. Individuals in the control group faced an effective
average tax rate of 74.3% for working full time at the minimum wage, while individuals in the treatment
group faced an effective average tax rate of 16.7%. Following Card and Hyslop (2005), we plot the
difference in monthly employment rates between the treatment and control groups. We add the observed
control group mean at the start of the experiment (23.5%) to the difference for scaling purposes.
Simulated employment rates are the fraction of individuals aged 16 to 46 working in a given month,
reflecting the age distribution of the SSP treatment group (see Appendix A). Panel (c): The EITC
expansion in the US in 1994-5 lowered average tax rates net of taxes and transfers for single mothers
from 50.8% in 1992 to 43.6% in 1996. Meyer (2010, Figure 2) reports annual employment rates for
single women using CPS data. We plot the employment rates of single mothers adjusted for observables
and time trends as in Meyer (2010); simulated employment rates are reported for individuals aged 16 to
46.FIGURE 2
Micro Predictions Versus Macro Data
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Real Wages × Micro Extensive Frisch
Employment for Prime-Age Males
Notes: Panel A plots log hours worked per adult vs. log of 1 – average tax rate using data from Prescott
(2004) across countries and time periods described in Appendix C. The data imply an aggregate hours
Hicksian elasticity of .7, as shown by the solid green best fit line. The dashed red line is drawn through
the mean of the x and y values with a slope of 0.58, in accordance with the aggregate hours micro
elasticity from Table 2. Panel B plots the log deviation of employment from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered
trend for the United States from 1948 to 2008. The data is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
available at http://www.bls.gov. The solid blue line is generated using seasonally adjusted quarterly data
on employment tabulated from the Current Population Survey, series LNS12000000Q. The raw data was
Hodrick-Prescott filtered using a smoothing parameter of 1600. The dotted black line is taken from the
same source for men ages 25-54, series LNS12000061Q. The dashed red line is a projected employment
series based on fluctuations in real wages. Real wages are measured as real hourly compensation for the
nonfarm business sector, Bureau of Labor Statistics series PRS85006153. To generate the projection,
real wages are Hodrick-Prescott filtered using a smoothing parameter of 1600 and multiplied by the
micro extensive margin Frisch elasticity of 0.32 from Table 1.